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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
TOM N. SOTF--.:R and 
HELEN P. SOTER, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-A ppcllants, 
-vs-
WASATCH DEVELOPMENT CORP., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant 
and 
PAUL C. BOYCE and 
HAZEL BOYCE, his wife, 
Defendants-Respondents 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 
11119 
This is an attempt by admittedly defaulting appel-
lants; who were represented, at all times, by competent 
counsel; who, after receiving every conceivable consid-
eration and after reeciving the benefit thereof; by double-
crossing and going back on not only their written agree-
ment, but also on their legal counsel, do now endeavor 
by use of the courts to effect an unjust, meritless and 
harrassing cause of action against respondents. Also, 
plaintiff, Tom N. Soter, is and was, at all times, by 
profession a licensed and experienced real estate sales-
man. 
Whenever the appellants are hereafter ref erred to, 
they will be ref erred to as plaintiffs. 
Whenever the respondents are hereinafter referred 
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to, they will be referred to as defendants Boyce. 
"\\Thenever the defendant, Wasatch Developml'nt 
(Jorporation, a Utah corporation, is hereafter referred 
to, it will be referred to as defendants Wasatch Develop-
ment Corporation. 
Plaintiffs were, at all times, represented by legal 
counsel, Richard L. Bird, Jr. 
Defendants Boyce were, at all times, represented 
by legal counsel, George H. Searle. 
Defendant vVasatch Development Corporation was, 
at all times, represented by Mr. Jim P. Hansen, Presi-
dent of Wasatch Development Corporation. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
Upon motion of defendants Boyce and after making 
findings of fact, the Trial Court concluded that plaill-
tiff's Complaint as to defendants Boyce should be dis-
missed with prejudice allowing plaintiffs cause of actioll 
against defendant Wasatch Development Corporatioll to 
remarn. 
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STATEMENT OE' F ACT8 
'I1he plaintiffs ,by Uniform Real Estate Contract, on 
September 2, 1963, contracted to purchase from Convest 
Corporation, the Castel Apartments and Convest Cor-
poration subsequently conveyed its interest in said prop-
erty to defendants Boyce. 
Plaintiffs became delinq_uent on the payments due 
under the terms of the contract and defendants Boyce 
did have served upon plaintiffs on the 22nd day of Sep-
tember, 1965, a "Five Day Demand That Default Be 
Remedied" by payment of $12,410.89 arrearage. (See 
li:xhibit "X" R. 80-81-82. Defendants Boye were entitled 
to enforce the forfeiture provisions of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract against the plaintiffs, but instead, did 
comply with the policy of Utah law which is to 
"encourage equitable out-of-court settlements; and 
to recognize a claim for conspiracy where the fore-
f eiture provision of a contract is not enforced 
would be a deviation from this policy," (See Bun-
nell v. Bills page 83 of 13 Utah 2nd). 
Said Default to the date of the filing of this brief has 
not been remedied and in addition thereto, neither have 
the plaintiffs or defendant Vv asatch Development Cor-
poration paid or tendered payment of any sum of money 
whatsoever since• the 22nd day of September, 1965 to 
the date hereof, a iwriod in excess of two and one-half 
years duration. 
Plaintiffs proposed at the time, by and through 
their counsel, Richard L. Bird, Jr., that defendants Boyce 
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ac.;cc~pt in lieu of defendants Boyce going forward with 
their forfeiture right ol their right to foreclose a:::; in 
ca:ses of mortgages (which includes a six month redemp-
tion period) an out-of-court settlement which consi:sted 
of a written agreement to be entered into beween the 
parties so as to keep legal expenses to a minimum and 
at the same time be for the best interests of all parties 
concerned. 
Plaintiffs thereafter prepared a written agreement 
and dated the :same the 17th day of September, 19G5. 
Said written proposal was prepared on plaintiffs' coun-
sel's stationery and was entitled "Agreement of Modifi-
cation of Contract" (See Exhibit "B" R. 83-85-86). 
Defendants Boyce refused to accept (in return for 
their promise not pursue their remedies under the terms 
of said Uniform Real Estate Contract) the written pro-
posal of the plaintiffs set forth in Exhibit "B" (Sel' 
R. 83-85-86) but did thereafter agree to not forfeit the 
plaintiffs or foreclose the plaintiffs out of any possible 
equity they might have had in the property under the 
written terms set forth in Exhibit "C" (See R. 87-88). 
'l1his written proposal, Exhibit "C", bearing the saml' 
date of September 17, 1965, was the same proposal sub-
mitted earlier by the plaintiffs in Exhibit "B" (See R. 
83-85-86) except as modified or as parts thereof were 
rejected as indicated by the additions in writing and 
the crossed-out portions indicated on the original writteu 
proposal made by plaintiffs and set forth in Exhibit 
"B" (See R. 83-85-86). 
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In reliance upon plaintiffs signing and agreeing to 
the terms set forth in agreement Exhibit "C" (tiee R. 87-
88), defendants Boyce refrained from immediately for-
feiting the plaintiffs out of said property or foreclosing 
the plaintiffs out of said property, saving thereby th(~ 
legal expenses that would be necessarily involved and 
allowing the plaintiffs approximately six ( 6) months to 
remedy their default. 
The following provisions were set forth and agreed 
to on Page 2 of Exhibit "C" (See R. 88): 
"During a period six months from the date 
hereof Buyers shall have the right to sell their 
interest, refinance or otherwise bring the pay-
ments under the contract current, and all things 
required to Buyers to any of such ends shall be 
performed by Sellers or permitted by Sellers if it 
appears that the cooperation of Sellers will enable 
Buyers to succeed in selling, refinancing or other-
wise bringing the payments current without dam-
age to the sellers." 
"If during the period of six months from the 
date hereof the monthly payments are not kept 
current and paid fully and Buyers shall be unable 
to sell, refinance, or otherwise bring current all 
past due and payments due under the said con-
tract, then Buyers .shall be conclusively presumed 
to have been in default for a period of six months 
and to have had reasonable opportunity to remedy 
the said default and sellers shall continue in pos-
session without any obligation to recognize any 
rights of Buyers to redeem or reinstate the con-
tract and no further legal action shall be neces-
sary to eliminate any and all claims of Buyers 
in and to the said property." 
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"Buyers have executed a quit claim deed to 
the property to Richard L. Bird, Jr., Attorney at 
Law, with copy attached hereto, which deed :-;hall 
be delivered to Sellers on March 15, 1966 if Buyers 
shall have failed to remedy their default as herein 
provided." 
"In other respects the said contract of Sep-
tember 2, 1963 shall remain in full force and 
effect." 
On the 12th day of March, 1966, the plaintiffs sold 
and conveyed all their right, title and interest in and 
to the property to defendant Wasach Development Cor-
poration and this deed was duly recorded three (3) days 
later on March 15, 1966 by the grantee thereof, Wasatch 
Development Corporation (See Exhibit "D" R. 89). 
(Prior to this time without knowledge or consent 
of defendants Boyce, the plaintiffs falsely represented 
that they owned the property and mortgaged the prop-
erty to one, Chris Apostle for the sum of $19,549.23, 
which mortgage to the date hereof has not yet been 
released or satisfied.) (See Exhibit "E" R. 90). 
After the plaintiffs had divested themselves of any 
further interest, they may have had in the property an<l 
also wrongfully mortgaged the property to one, Chris 
Apostle ,for $19,549.23 thereby wrongfully and unlaw-
fully slandering and clouding the title to the property 
the defendants Boyce were approached by Mr. Jim Han-
sen, the President of Wasatch Development Corporation, 
who represented to the defendants Boyce that plaintiff;; 
had sold out and deeded the property to Wasatch DL'-
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velopment Corporation who he reprseented. Hansen tried 
to negotiate with defendants Boyce for an equity in a 
home for the arrearage plaintiffs owed under the Uni-
form Real Estate Contract to the defendants Boyce. 
(See Exhibit "H" R. 93-94 written by plaintiffs' 
counsel verifying Hansen's attempt and plaintiffs 
approval thereof to deal directly with defendants 
Boyce concerning the arrearage and Hansen's 
attempt to satisfy defendants Boyce as their con-
tract requires.) 
The 15th day of .March, 1966, passed without com-
pliance by either the plaintiffs or defendant Wasatch 
Development Corporation meeting the requirements and 
defendants Boyce did, on the 21st day of March, 1966, 
make written demand upon plaintiffs and plaintiffs' 
counsel for delivery of the Quit Claim Deed executed by 
the plaintiffs. (See Exhibit "G" R. 92). 
The same day defendants Boyce's counsel, George 
H. Searle, telephoned plaintiffs' counsel, Richard L. Bird, 
Jr. and in no uncertain terms, notified plaintiffs' counsel 
that defendants Boyce "wanted only money" and not 
anything Hansen representing Wasatch Development 
Corporation had to offer in lieu thereof (See Exhibit 
"H" R. 93). 
The next day, the 22nd day of March, 1966, plain-
tiffs' connsel prepared and mailed on behalf of the plain-
tiffs, a letter to the defendants Boyce's counsel, George 
H. Searle, whereby he confirms giving notice to the 
plaintiffs that defendants Boyce 
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"want money only and not a chance to negotiate 
with Hansen for Hansen's equity in a home." 
"That plaintiffs had 15 days additional to come 
itp with another buyer who could produce the 
cash." 
Counsel for plaintiffs further verified 
Also, 
"that since 1.lf r. Soter has in effect, sold to Mr. 
Hans en, Soter has nothing more to say abo1.d it." 
"Hansen recorded the Qitit Claim Deed and has 
proceeded negotiations on a bilateral basis with 
Boyce. This is alright with us provided it has the 
approval of yoit and the Boyces." (See Exhibit 
"H" R. 93-94) 
At this time, the 22nd day of March, 1966, plaintiffs 
had acquired from defendant Wasatch Development Cor-
poration a completed "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase" (See R. 9 and R. 18) and had also divested 
themselves of any and all interest in the Uniform Real 
J:lJstate Contract by which they were purchasing from 
Defendants Boyce (See Assignment of Contract R. 6fi). 
Plaintiffs further had divested themselves of any and 
all interest in the realty by "Quit Claim Deed" to de-
fendant Wasatch Development Corporation which was 
delivered and promptly recorded upon acceptance b>' 
defendant Wasatch Development Corporation (See R. 64) 
"An Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Pur-
chase" may constitute a bindi.ng contract has often 
been n~cognized by this Court" (See BunlPll '· 
Bills Page 85 of 13 Ut. 2nd quoting Reich v. 
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Christopulos, 123 Ut. 137, 256 P 2nd 238; Reese 
v. Harper 8 Ut. 2nd 119, 329 P 2nd 410; Andrea-
son v. Hansen, 8 U t. 2nd 370, 335 P 2nd 404.) 
On the 25th day of March, 1966, the plaintiffs by 
and through their counsel, Richard L. Bird, acknowledged 
"the default of Thomas N. Soter in the payments 
due Paul C. Boyce on the property at 171 East 
4500 South." 
Likewise, abo acknowledged by the plaintiffs, was that 
the plaintiffs 
"are of the opinion that except for the protracted 
negotiations between Mr. Hansen and the Boyces 
and the encouragement which these negotiations 
gave Mr. Hansen to believe they were in substan-
tial agreement there should be an extension of 
time in which to meet the reqitirement of payment 
under the contract." 
Acknowledged also was 
"that Mr. Soter will have until April 15, 1966, 
to present the payments due in full and this should 
be made to you without further negotiations with 
Mr. Boyce." 
Also understood and agreed to was 
"Mr. Soter is in agreement that unless the money 
is raised and tendered to you on or before April 
15, 1966, I am aidhorized to deliver to you a Quit-
Claim Deed from Mr. and Mrs. Soter which I hold 
in my files." (See Exhibit "I" R. 95) 
The foregoing wm; set forth in writing and "Notice" 
thereof was given by plaintiffs' counsel to plaintiffs 
and also to defendant vVasatch Development Corpora-
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tion. (See Exhibit "I" R. 95). 
Payment of said money referred to was not made 
or tendered to the defendants Boyce on or before the 
15th day of April, 1966, and on the 12th day of May, 
1966, demand was made by defendants, Boyce, upon 
plaintiffs' counsel Richard L. Bird, Jr., and the Deed 
was finally mailed to the defendants Boyce on the 21st 
day of May, 1966, a period of more than two months 
past the time when it was due on the 15th day of March, 
1966 to the defendants Boyce. (See Exhibit "K" R. 97) 
DEFENDANTS BOYCE'S POSITION 
The Trial Courts decision should be sustained and 
plaintiffs denied an-{estopped from trying to use the 
courts to make a mockery of contractual obligations and 
honor. 
ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiffs admit on Page 3 of their Brief that they 
were delinquent on the payments due under the terms 
of the Uniform Real Estate Contract dated the 2nd of 
September, 1963. (See also R. 27 and 35). Plaintiff8 
also admit the written agreement dated the 17th of Sep-
tember, 1965 wherein plaintiffs were given approximately 
six months to bring the payments current, sell or re-
finance, "or otherwise bringing the payments current 
without damage to the sellers," and if plaintiffs faikd 
so to do, a Quit-Claim Deed to the subject property was 
to be delivered to defendants Boyce by plaintiffs' attor-
ney. (See Exhibit "C" R. 88) 
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On Page four ( 4) of plaintiffs" brief, plaintiffs 
allege they fonnd a buyer, \Vasatch Developrnt•nt Cor-
poration, and pursuant thereto the plaintiffs did give 
a Quit Claim Deed to defendant \Vasatch Development 
Corporation. It is submitted the only duty owed by 
defendants Boyce to plaintiffs under such circumstances 
was to accept said buyer in the stead of plaintiffs bnt 
subject to the right to receive payment and full per-
formance on the part of Wasatch Development Corpora-
tion of any and all the obligations owed by the plain-
tiffs to defendants Boyce under the terms of the Uniform 
Heal Estate Contract dated the 2nd of September, 1963 
hereto before referred to. Defendants Boyce had a legal 
right to payment, had a present, existing economic in-
terest to protect ownership and the condition of the 
property, to insist upon "Mr. Boyce wants money and 
not a chance to negotiate with Hansen for Hansl'n \; 
equity in a home" (See Exhibit "H" R. 93). Defendants 
Boyce could not have possibly done anything detrimental 
to plaintiffs' negotiations with defendant Wasatch De-
velopment Corporation prior to 15 March, 1968 or the 
'·Ernest Money Agreement" would not have been exe-
cuted, (R. 9 and R. 18) the "Assignment" executed (R. 
65) and "Deed" given ( R. 64). After the 15th day of 
March, 1966, if payment of arrearage had not been made 
to defendants Boyce, they were entitled to 
"continnP in possession without any obligation to 
recognize any rights of plaintiffs to redeem or 
reinstate the contract and no further lPgal action 
shall be necessary to eleminate any and all claims 
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of plaintiff in and to the said property" {Sec 
Exhibit "C" R. 88) (See Bunnell v. Bills at Page 
90 of 13 Ut. 2nd). 
Without confusing matters but to point out the false 
colors and the way plaintiffs operate it is noteworthy 
to notice the affirmative defenses that remain unan-
swered, set out in defendant Wasatch Development Cor-
poration Answer to plaintiff's Complaint (R. 25-26) 
(6) & (7) False representations as to apartment 
mcome 
(8) Non disclosure of Escrow Agreement (See 
Exhibit "C" R. 87-88) (Which is also note-
worthy to the effect that if defendant W a-
satch Development Corporation was without 
knowledge of same it would be impossible for 
defendants Boyce to inter£ ere between plain-
tiffs and defendant Wasatch Development 
Corporation, let alone accept and record Deed 
(See Exhibit "D" R. 89) accepting and obli-
gating themselves under Ernest money agree-
ment. (See R. 9 and 18) 
(9) Undisclosed and unlawful mortgage lien and 
encumbrance to Chris Apostal (See Exhibit 
"E" R. 90) which made it impossible for <l<'-
f endant Wasatch Development Corporation to 
borrow money on property purchased; also 
see plaintiffs' false Warranty of no other 
encumbrance (R. 65) dated 12 March 1966. 
Of more importance are sworn answen; to defendants 
Boyce Interrogatory 1 (R. 32) requesting how, when, 
where and what interference caused the transaction be-
tween plaintiffs and defendant Wasatch Development 
Corporation to be not completed keeping in mind their 
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Ernest Money Agreement is dated 8 l<'ebruary, 1966 
(R. 9 and 18). The Assignment of Contract is dated 12 
March, 196() (R. G5) and Deed is notarized the 12th day 
of March, 1966 and recorded the 15th day of March, 
1966 (R. 64). 
I February 5, 1966, conven;ation in which plain-
tiffs allege defendant, Paul Boyce, was considering trad-
ing his equity in the apartment for a home. (It is hard 
for the undersigned to understand how the plaintiffs' 
can complain if the defendants Boyce chose to sell their 
equity for any price whatsoever, even for $10.00 as 
would be their right and how this could interfere with 
plaintiffs' negotiations with defendant Wasatch Develop-
ment Corporation when 3 days later the Plaintiffs and 
Defendants ·wasatch Development Corporation executed 
the Earnest Money Agreement. 
II February 20, 1966, Request by plaintiffs to de-
fendant, Paul Boyce, for a breakdown of income which 
although not in the record, was supplied and given to 
plaintiffs. This request was satisfied by defendants 
Boyce in compliance with paragraph 4 of hereto before 
modification agreement (See Exhibit "C" R. 88) and 
which required of defendants Boyce cooperation so that 
plaintiffs could "succeed in selling, refinancing or other-
\\~isc• bringing the payments cnrrent without damage to 
ch•f Pndants Boye<'. (Plaintiffs succeeded in selling and 
gave Assignment and Deed to defendant Wasatch De-
V<'lopment Corporation on 12 March, 1966) (See R. 64 
and R. 65) 
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III March 1, 1966, conversation with defendant, 
Paul Boyce, to the effect that he and defendant Wasatch 
Dewloprnent Corporation were working out a deal 
(Plaintiffs had a binding Ernest Money Agreement al-
ready executed with defendant Wasatch Development 
Corporation and the Deed and Assignment was given 
by Plaintiffs in compliance therewith 12 days later (See 
H. G4 and R. 65) to Defendant Wasatch Development 
Corporation.) 
IY March 14, 19G6 (two days after plaintiffs had 
given ,on 12 March, 1966, a Warranty Assignment of 
Contract (R. 65) and Deed to property (R. 64) to de-
fendant Wasatch Development Corporation which was 
accepted by and recorded by defendant Wasatch Develop-
ment Corporation (See "Grantee" top of Exhibit "D" 
R. 89). Meeting with plaintiffs and all defendants in 
which defendants orally agreed to accept less than the 
$13,000.00 cash arrearage. It is submitted that acceptance 
of any lesser sum than $13,000.00 owed could hardly hnrt 
or be detrimental to plaintiffs and would in no way, 
effect plaintiffs' right to enforce their rights against dr-
fendant Wasatch Development Corporation and the 
property which plaintiffs had divested themselves thereof 
two days earlier. It is common sense if the three pre-
vious alleged conversations I, II and III had been detri-
mental to plaintiffs the defendant Wasatch Developmrnt 
Corporation certainly would not have accepted and re-
corded the Deed (R. 89) and the Warranty of Contract 
assignment (R. 65) and after doing so, be attempting to 
get defendants Boyce to accept less than he $13,000.00 
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arrearage owed if they did not believe tlll'y had to be 
obligated to pay the same at that time. Any, all and full 
complete rights of the plaintiffs were protected by plain-
tiffs further recording of "Claim of Vendors Lien" pn·-
pared by plaintiffs' counsel and recorded the 17th of 
March 1966. Further it would at this tim<:~ be none of 
plaintiffs' business or concern if defendants Boyce did 
agree to accept less than the $13,000.00 cash arrearage 
owing to them. Plaintiffs had already executed a bind-
ing "Sales Contract" with defendant Wasatch Develop-
ment Corporation; had already assigned all their interm;t 
in their Uniform Real Estate Contract whereby they were 
purchasing from defendants Boyce and had already di-
vested themselves of any interest in the real property 
by Quit Claim Deed to defendant Wasatch Development 
Corporation. 
"Where persons have merely pursued their 
own ends without any desire or intention of caus-
ing another to breach his contract, they should 
not be held liable for the others' breach. To hold 
them liable for damages so far removed from their 
action, would amount to an undue restraint upon 
their freedom to act." (See Bunnell v. Bills at 
Page 91 of 13 Ut. 2nd). 
All plaintiffs or their assignee defendant Wasatch 
Development Corporation had to do was to come up and 
pay the arrearage owed before the 15th of March, 1966. 
Neither plaintiffs or their assignee defendant Wasatch 
Development Corporation could do this, defendants Boyce 
were entitled to nothing more nor were they obligated 
to take or accept anything less. 
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Lastly - If the contention of the plaintiffs which 
amounts only to the defendants Boyce refusing to sell 
or give their equity for less than the cash owed to them, 
by accepting the "cashless" defendant Wasatch Develop-
ment Corporation in their stead, has any merit whatso-
ever, the same is most certainly, adequately and legally 
cured by the consideration given by defendants Boyce 
in extending to 15 April, 1966 time for plaintiffs to 
make payment and plaintiffs' agreement 
"that unh~ss the money was raised and tendered 
before the 15.th of April, 1966 the Deed left with 
plaintiffs' counsel was to be delivered to defend-
ants Boyce." (See E~ibit "H" R. 93-94 and Ex-
hibit "I" R. 95) 
Defendants finally received the Deed promised from 
plaintiffs' counsel on 22 May, 1966, eight months after 
these defendants first made demand upon plaintiffs to 
pay $12,410.89 arrearage owed. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that plaintiffs' appeal 
should be dismissed and denied and the lower court:s 
decision sustained leaving to plaintiffs whatever cause 
of action available, if any they have, against defendant 
Wasatch Development Corporation. 
Respectfully, 
SEARLE & ASHWORTH 
tf1 / ByQ~,L~~ 
2805 South State Street · 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendants, 
Paul C. Boyce and Hazel 
Boyce, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
